The Ban on AI – Why was it banned? | Will Artifical Intelligence ever replace Rabbonim? When perfected will you be able to rely on AI for Psak?

Rav Dovid, shalom! Thank you for yet another valuable contribution to discussion on an important topic. I much appreciate your show.

Rav Aharon Lopiansky commented that AI may make us reevaluate what it means to be human. I recently heard a Hebrew podcast with Rav Yehoshua Shapira which weaves this assertion into a grand tapestry of how HKBH is using the AI revolution to direct history. I thought you would find it interesting. Here is a (Gemini generated) overview of the main theme of his thesis. The podcast itself can be found at: https://youtu.be/lqAoItZ6LfM

SUMMARY: The podcast features Rabbi Yehoshua Shapira exploring the spiritual and philosophical implications of the AI revolution.

Based on the transcript, here is a summary of the perspective presented on how historical technological advances guide human focus and where AI fits into that process:

1. The Historical Trajectory: Peeling Away the Layers

The Rabbi describes human history as a progressive “unburdening” of humanity, where each technological revolution removes a specific type of toil, effectively peeling away outer layers of human existence to reveal something deeper.

* The Industrial Revolution: Replaced physical labor (hands, back, and shoulders). Machines took over the physical “sweat of the brow,” saving the body from endless toil.

* The Transportation & Information Revolution: Replaced the effort of connection and movement. Cars, planes, phones, and the internet saved the time and effort needed to travel, meet, or access information.

* The AI Revolution: This is unique because it replaces mental labor. AI now saves us the effort of thinking, processing, and even creating. It can think faster, clearer, and more creatively than humans in many technical aspects.

2. The Crisis of Meaning

This progression leads to a sharp existential crisis: “If the machine can do my work, travel for me, and now even think and create for me, what is left for me? Why am I needed?”

The Rabbi notes that AI threatens the “persona” or the intellect, which we often consider our core identity. If AI is the expert, the artist, and the writer, the human role in those areas diminishes.

3. The “Driving Guidance” & Opportunity

The perspective offered is that this is not an accident, but a form of divine or historical guidance moving humanity toward a specific state:

* Returning to “Gan Eden” (Garden of Eden): The Rabbi suggests these advances are progressively lifting the curse of “by the sweat of your brow.” As we are freed from survival (physical sweat) and technical thinking (mental sweat), we are being guided back to a state where we can focus on what truly matters.

* From Chochmah (Intellect) to Da’at (Deep Connection): The specific opportunity of AI is that by stripping away our reliance on technical intellect (which AI can mimic), we are forced to focus on what AI cannot do: true spiritual connection, awe, moral choice, and “heart.”

* The Unique Human Core: AI has no soul, no feelings, and no “Awe of God” (Yirat Hashem). It can mimic creativity but cannot experience the “light” or the deep, wordless connection between souls or with the Divine.

4. Summary of the Perspective

The “driving guidance” of history is pushing humanity into a corner where we can no longer define ourselves by what we do (work) or even by what we know (intellect). We are being guided to define ourselves by who we are—our essential soul and our capacity for deep, spiritual connection (Da’at).

AI is the final tool in this process: it clears the “distraction” of technical thinking so that humans can finally focus on the ultimate purpose—”Le’ovda U’leshomra” (to work it and guard it) in a spiritual sense—being partners in revealing the Divine presence in the world, a task no machine can perform.

Really interesting. As to the question raised about the desirability of a posek knowing the person asking a shailah. . . Google trains Gemini in part using gmail contents. This article describing the data sources of LLMs may be of interest: https://www.sentisight.ai/where-search-llms-crawl-data/

When AI is used in medicine to survey the literature that’s a problem. The literature is massively corrupt and rife with fraud. (See “reproducibility crisis.) There are many reasons for this.

True, AI may find applications in filtering for reliable information. . . but until bad actors can be identified and blocked, and the existing literature purged but (and this will be an ongoing problem with LLMs,) without relying on the sort of “consensuses” that hide adverse drug effects, bad peer review, and conceal conflicts of interest. LLMs are easy to poison. That may well be remedied, for a while, then more bad actors will likely figure out ways around the defenses.

It would be really interesting if you can ask a Rabbi to ask ai to pasken for him during a few weeks after he had paskened himself the same question. On the podcast i heared mainly opinions, and it can be checked easily

R’ Dovid, hope you are well. I thoroughly enjoyed your podcast on AI, especially the part with my father, Rabbi Dr. Aaron Glatt, and brother, R’ Chezkie. Just to comment on your point at the end about the Bach, that even a child can serve as a dayan. This Bach is a major outlier in the sugya, and, on the contrary, most poskim hold that one must be a bar daas to serve as a judge. See below for my write-up on this sugya. All the best, Ephraim Glatt

MINIMUM AGE OF DAYANIM

Question: Is there a minimum age requirement to serve as a judge in secular court and/or Beis Din?

Short Answer: The minimum age requirement of a judge in secular court varies depending on the jurisdiction, while there is a seven-way machlokes regarding the minimum age requirement of a judge in Beis Din.

Explanation:

I. Introduction – Youngest Judges Ever?

Who is the youngest federal judge ever appointed? The youngest is Alex Kozinski (July 23, 1950 – present), who was appointed by Ronald Reagen to the Claims Court in 1982 (32 years and 2 months), and then to the Ninth Circuit in 1985. Interestingly, the third youngest is Kathryn Kimball Mizelle (1987 – present), who was appointed by Donald Trump in 2020 (33 years) to the Middle District of Florida.

Interestingly, it appears that one of the youngest, if not the youngest, state court judge was appointed to the bench in 2021. Specifically, Matthew Bradley, just a few days prior to his 25th birthday, was sworn in as the new municipal judge for the Town of Dinosaur, Colorado.

II. Legal Background – Federal Judges

The Constitution does not have any minimum age requirements for federal judges serving on the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals or District Courts. Nor does the Constitution require these federal judges to even be lawyers. See generally Rittenband v. Cory, 159 Cal. App. 3d 410, 428 (Ct. App. 1984) (“article III of the Constitution prohibits age distinctions with respect to the federal judiciary through the absence of a minimum age requirement and the guarantee of life tenure”).

Instead, Article III, Section 1 merely provides that the “judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”

Note that based on Article II of the Constitution, federal judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Why are there so few qualifications, including a minimum age requirement (unlike President/Senators/Congressman who have requirements), for federal judges? Some answers have been suggested by academics. See John R. Vile, The U.S. Constitution and Judicial Qualifications: A Curious Omission, 100 Judicature 65 (2016). First, federal judges are appointed, not elected. In other words, since federal judges are appointed by the President and Senate, formal requirements are less important. See id. Second, legal education was not yet systematic, so formal requirements — like requirements to be a lawyer or to have practiced for a certain number of years — were inappropriate. Id. Third, there was a fear that qualifications for federal judges would make these judges too aristocratic and removed from the common people. Id. Fourth, the Founders might have expected Congress to establish judicial qualifications for lower federal judges. Fifth, the omission of judicial qualifications may stem from the influence of contemporary practices in existing state constitutions at the time of the Constitutional Convention which did not have educational requirements and minimum age requirements.

III. Legal Background – State Court Judges – New York & New Jersey

To be a New York state court judge (in Supreme Court, Appellate Division, or Court of Appeals), the New York Constitution requires that the judge have “been admitted to practice law in this state at least ten years.” N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 20. Most other lower New York courts, such as county court, surrogate’s court, and family court, only require the judge to have been “admitted to practice law in this state at least five years.” Id. There is no minimum age requirement in any New York court.

Similarly, to be a New Jersey state court judge (in Supreme Court, Appellate Division, or Superior Court), the New Jersey Constitution requires that each judge have “been admitted to the practice of law in this State for at least 10 years.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 2.

IV. Legal Background – State Court Judges – Other States

Some states, however, do have age requirements for judges. For example, Texas requires its judges to be at least 25 years old. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.001. Utah requires its judges to be at least 25 years old, with Supreme Court judges being at least 30 years old. See Utah Const. art. VIII, § 7. Tennessee requires its judges to be at least 30 years old, with Supreme Court judges being at least 35 years old. T.C.A. art. VI, §§ 3-4. New Mexico requires its judges to be at least 35 years old. See N.M. Const. art. VI, §§ 8, 14.

In general, there is minimal case law discussion regarding these judicial minimum age requirements, or lack thereof. However, the Supreme Court of Idaho in 1892 did address whether the thirty-year minimum age requirement for a judge was an impermissible “bill of attainder” (a legislative act that unfairly penalizes people) and held it was not. See Shepherd v. Grimmett, 2 Idaho 1123, 31 P. 793, 795 (1892).

Notably, a study from fifteen years ago found that states with minimum age requirements had less diverse benches. See Malia Reddick, New Judicial Diversity Research from Ajs, 93 Judicature 209 (2010). In particular, “[f]ewer women judges served on high courts in states with a minimum-age qualification.” Id.

V. Legal Background – Decisions Binding?

But are the decisions of a too-young judge who was inappropriately appointed or elected still binding?

Fascinatingly, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1859 addressed this very issue. See Blackburn v. State, 40 Tenn. 690, 691 (1859). After a judge who was under the age of thirty was given a temporary appointment by the Governor upon the death of the previous judge, a defendant who was convicted by the young new judge argued that the conviction was not binding. Id. The Court held otherwise, reasoning that “it is well settled that the judgment and official acts of an officer, de facto, are binding and valid, and the competency of the functionary acting under commission cannot be enquired into by parties affected by them. This principle was adopted … to prevent a failure of justice.” Id.

More recently, in 1995, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld this ruling, albeit in a slightly different context. See State ex rel. Newsom v. Biggers, 911 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tenn. 1995). The Newsom court held that any ruling given by a judge before he was disqualified for violating the requirements to be a judge, such as length of years elected for, is still a binding ruling. Id. Citing Blackburn, the Court explained that there is a distinction between (i) a “judge de jure,” a judge “legally appointed and qualified to exercise the office,” and (ii) a “judge de facto,” a judge “who actively assumes the duties of his office after he has been appointed by the governor of the state, or has been elected by the people.” Id. The latter person “is at least a de facto judge even though facts [from another source] might disclose irregularities in the appointment or the election.” Id. The Court thus held that “the official acts” of a “judge de facto“ — before he is removed — “are binding on third persons and the public.” Id.

Some other states disagree. In particular, the Supreme Court of West Virginia was faced with a similar issue in 1977. See Smoot v. Dingess, 160 W. Va. 558, 563–64, 236 S.E.2d 468, 472–73 (1977). A judge who was too young convicted the defendant for failing to pay alimony. The Court, however, reversed the conviction, as “all orders entered by [the judge] while he was under the constitutionally required age of thirty years, are void and of no force or effect.” Id.

VI. Halachic Background – Introduction

What does halacha hold about this question? Is there a minimum age requirement for a person to serve as a judge on a Beis Din for monetary matters?

This author believes that there are essentially seven opinions on this issue, as set forth below.

VII. Halachic Background – Opinion #1 (No Age Requirement)

There is no posuk in the torah, nor any Gemara that expressly sets forth a minimum age requirement for judges. Indeed, the Rambam, Rif, and Rosh all are silent on this question, implying that even a child under the age of 13 may serve as a judge. The Bach (C”M 7:3) actually acknowledges this reality, noting that even a child may serve as a judge (at least on a d’oraysa level).

A proof to this opinion is history itself. Shlomo HaMelech, who became king at age 12 (according to many), served as a judge immediately upon appointment as king. Thus, it appears clear that someone under 13 may serve as a judge. The Urim V’Tumim (C”M 7, Tumim) deflects this proof, as the age of adulthood in olden times was not 13, but rather 8, the age in which a male could father a child. Thus, Shlomo HaMelech had the status of a 13 year old (i.e. he was an adult) already from age 8.

Notably, the Ketzos HaChoshen (C”M 7) queries how a child could serve as a judge when he himself cannot be judged (as he is not yet a “bar chiyuv”). He answers that even a child can be “judged” if he steals right in front of the judges themselves.

VIII. Halachic Background – Opinion #2 (Age 13, But Without Signs of Physical Maturity)

The Yerushalmi (Sanhedrin 4:7) states differences between money matters and capital punishment cases. One difference (according to one opinion) is that a person under the age of 20 may serve as a judge for monetary matters, even if he has not yet reached the age of physical maturity (i.e. “shtei sa’aros”) (“PM”). Both the Bal HaItur (Beirurin, 2 Amud 3) and Rabbeinu Yeruchum (Meisharim, Nesiv 1 Chelek 1) interpret the Yerushalmi as permitting any child over the age of 13 to serve as a judge, even without PM. The Tur (C”M 7:3) cites this opinion, adding that the 13 year old must be highly intelligent and capable as well.

What is the explanation of such an opinion? Two views are expressed by the poskim.

First, the Bach (C”M 7:3) explains that this is merely a d’rabbanon requirement, as m’doraysa, even a child under the age of 13 may serve as a judge. The chachamim instituted this requirement so that the litigants should feel that their judge is an adult and will treat the case seriously (as he himself is afraid of punishment from Hashem for ruling incorrectly).

Second, the Perisha (C”M ibid) explains that this is a d’oraysa requirement, that the judge be a “gadol.” He does not, however, need PM, as a judge need not be an “ish” (a man) like is required to be a witness (based on a verse in the torah). In other words, the Perisha creates a distinction between “gadlus” and “ish,” with a judge merely requiring “gadlus.”

IX. Halachic Background – Opinion #3 (Age 13, But Must Also Have PM)

The Mishnah (Niddah 49b) states that any person who is permitted to serve as a judge, may serve as a witness. The inference of this statement is that if you are not permitted to serve as a witness, you may certainly not serve as a judge. Because a child under the age of 13 and who does not yet have PM may not serve as a witness, he may also not serve as a judge.

Both the Bach and Perisha note that the Tur, who cites an opinion that a “katan may not serve as a judge,” sources this opinion on the Mishnah in Niddah. Thus, the minimum age to serve as a judge is 13 together with PM, the age in which one may serve as a witness.

Separately, the Rashba (Sh”ut, 6:179) holds that the minimum age requirement for a judge is 13 plus PM, but does not cite the Mishnah in Niddah. Instead, he holds this minimum age requirement, as being a judge is no different than any other mitzvah, that you must be a “gadol,” i.e. 13 with PM.

How do the earlier two Opinions (#1 & 2 above) explain this clear Mishnah in Niddah? Two answers are given. First, the Bach explains, based on Tosafos (Niddah ibid) that the rule of comparing witness to judges only applies to males but not to females. Thus, one could argue that it only applies to adults but not children. Therefore, it is possible to have a child serve as a judge even though he cannot serve as a witness. Second, the Sma (C”M 7:9) answers that even if a child under 13 could serve as a judge, it would not contradict the Mishnah. The Mishnah merely means that just like a witness has an age minimum, so too a judge has an age minimum. These two minimums are not necessarily the same though.

X. Halachic Background – Opinions #4 (Age 18 without PM) and #5 (Age 18 with PM)

The Gemara (Shabbos 56b) discusses King Yoshiyahu and a posuk which details that he was “shav” at 18 when he found a sefer torah and took mussar from it. The Gemara cites two opinions on the interpretation of this posuk. Shmuel holds that it means that Yoshiyahu paid the losing litigant for all cases that he had previously judged between the age of 8 until 18. Rav “disagrees” and holds that it means that Yoshiyahu did actual teshuvah (having previously been a sinner).

Based on the opinion of Shmuel, certain Gaonim (cited in Rabbeinu Yeruchum and the Bal HaItur, above) hold that a person may not serve as a judge until the age of 18. The Tur (ibid) cites this opinion as well.

But does this opinion require PM as well? The Taz (C”M 7:3) wonders this very question, ultimately suggesting that there is an opinion (within the safeik of Ri Bartzeloni, see supra) that holds that merely being 18 is sufficient to serve as a judge; PM is not required. This is Opinion #4. On the other hand, the Tur (and many others) cite the opinion of Shmuel in the Gemara as requiring both age 18 and PM. This is Opinion #5.

What is the reason for these opinions (#4 and 5)? Why 18? Three nuanced opinions are given.

First, the Bach appears to focus on 18 being an age of intellectual maturity, an age where a person is one quarter of “his life” and his brain is capable of analytical skills, i.e. “intellectually mature.”

Second, the Perisha focuses on the strength and clout of the 18 year old, as he is now a “gever guvrin” to save improperly taken funds and have them returned to the rightful owner, i.e., “physically mature.”

Third, the Levush mentions the 18 year old’s knowledge of business, as he now has experience in finance and other transactions, i.e., “socially mature.”

How do the earlier opinions (Opinions #1, 2, and 3) debunk the seemingly clear proof from this Gemara that the judge must be at least 18? Moreover, why would anyone follow the Yerushalmi when we have a conflicting Bavli? Perhaps one can suggest four answers.

First, perhaps they poskin like Rav in the Gemara who disagrees with the entire premise that Yoshiyahu retracted any earlier judgments.

Second, perhaps they hold like Rashi on the Gemara who explains the Gemara in a way that has nothing to do with Yoshiyahu’s age. Rashi explains that Shmuel holds that Yoshiyahu retracted earlier judgments when he turned 18 because he now learned the correct halacha after having read the torah he found. Indeed, the Maharsha (Shabbos ibid) proves this interpretation from the language of the Gemara itself which states “age 8 until 18.” The fact that the Gemara does not say “age 8 until age 18” implies that 18 was not his age but rather the year of Yoshiyahu’s reign, when he was 26. Surely this is not the minimum age for a judge, so Yoshiyahu must have retracted his earlier rulings simply because they were incorrect and not because he was the wrong age. [See also Rashash who changes girsa in Rashi based on the Maharsha’s proof.]

Third, the Tur explains that Yoshiyahu retracted his earlier rulings as a “chumra yeseira,” an added stringency. In other words, you cannot prove anything from the Gemara about a general person’s minimum age requirement to serve as a judge, as Yoshiyahu was strict on himself.

Fourth, perhaps the Gemara is discussing l’chatchila, the ideal age for a judge, while the Yerushalmi is discussing b’dieved. In fact, the Tur cites Ri Bartzeloni who was unsure whether to follow the Bavli or Yerushalmi. The Taz explains that the Ri Bartzeloni held that if we would follow the Bavli, it would only mean that the under-18 year old could not judge l’chatchila. Once he judged, however, the ruling was still valid, (presumably like the Yerushalmi). [Note though that the Perisha understands Ri Bartzeloni a bit differently, that if we followed the Bavli, the pre-18 judgments would not be valid even b’dieved. This would contradict this suggested answer.]

XI. Halachic Background – Opinions #6 (Age 20 with PM) and #7 (Age 40 with PM)

The Pischei Teshuvah (C”M 7:4) cites two more opinions.

The Mishkenos Yaakov (C”M 5) holds that a permanent judge should be at least 20 years old, as this is the age where he can execute real estate transactions. We require a judge to be an “adult” for all available financial transactions. This is Opinion #6. [As an aside, see sefer Ohr L’Arba’ah Asar, p.205, by R’ Mordechai Gross who uses this opinion to explain a puzzling medrash about Moshe Rabbeinu, that he was not an “ish” until age 20.]

The Shvus Yaakov (C”M 1:140) holds that the judge should be at least 40 years old if he judges by himself (and not as a panel of 3). This is because we have other sources requiring a posek of issur/heter to be at least 40 years old. Monetary matters are no different.

XII. Halachic Background – Codified Ruling

Shulchan Aruch (C”M 7:3) cites two “yesh omrim” — Opinion #5 (18 with PM) and Opinion #2 (13 without PM). The Shach (3) cites the Bach, who follows Opinion #2.

[As an aside, the Rama (Y”D 1:5) holds that one may not receive a kabbalas shechita until age 18. The Gra (ibid) sources this opinion from our halacha by a judge, perhaps implying that the Rama adopts Opinion #5.]

The Birkei Yosef (C”M 7) notes that when Shulchan Aruch cites two “yesh omrim” opinions, he himself follows the second “yesh omrim.” Thus, Shulchan Aruch also holds like Opinion #2. Nevertheless, the Birkei Yosef himself holds like Opinion #3 (13 with PM) based on the Rashba.

The Aruch Hashulchan (C”M 7) cites the multiple opinions, notes that Opinions #6 and 7 are “unnecessary stringencies” and ultimately adopts Opinion #3, we never allow a katan (under 13 and without PM) to do anything in halacha.

Hi, I have this question that keeps coming up whenever I’m shopping and when my kids get treats at avos ubonim all these food have a halachic approval yet the science today says it’s poison and is causing cancers and all sorts of other issues like ADHD etc… How can we eat it? Don’t we have to look after our bodies? And how can a hechsher approve it?

Many thanks

Ruby Abenson